Internship Archives | Forensic Blogs

April 30, 2020 by LCDI

Data Recovery Blog 2

Data on a screen, various numbers highlighted green, with a red open lock

Data Is Not As “Deleted” As You Think

Here at The Leahy Center for Digital Forensics and Cybersecurity, the Data Recovery team has been hard at work searching through hard drives. These drives have been wiped using different methods in order to find any Personally Identifiable Information, or PII, that can be tied back to an individual.

At this point, ten out of the twenty eight drives purchased have been fully analyzed for the purposes of recovering data. Three drives, numbered 7, 9, and 10, all contained PII data. Drive 7 used the wiping method of DBAN, which stands for Darik’s Boot and Nuke, and is a free Linux utility. Drives 9 and 10 use the Xerase method, put forth by EPS. Both of these utilities claim to offer “secure absolute destruction”, yet how secure can they be if a team of analysts is able to recover data using tools that are freely available to the public?

The Recovery Process

For this project, we are using four “freeware” tools to recover data. These tools are SluethKit’s Autopsy, FTK Imager, Bulk Extractor, and Eric Zimmerman’s “bstrings” utility for Windows. Every drive that was purchased was run through all of these tools, not only to ensure visibility of data, but to determine if one tool has superior discovery abilities for deleted data. The tools are relatively simple to begin using, but require a bit of technical knowledge to become comfortable with. We have built a beginner-friendly user guide for how to start all four tools for acquisitions of data, which can be seen below.

Autopsy: Open Autopsy. Fill out the stating form as needed. Select “Add Data Source” –> “Unallocated Space Image File”. Select the first piece of the drive.

Wait for the image to finish scanning. This will take a while.

Bstrings: Open the command line in the folder in which you extracted bstrings. Type out the command to run it on a folder recursively to search an entire drive at once. Example: bstrings.exe -d Disk Location > File Where Data Found Is Saved\bstrings.txt Adjust the conventions to match the image that you are working on. Bulk Extractor: Point Bulk Extractor to the desired image Ex: HDD02.001, and a directory where you would like the output to go. Turn on all scanners by checking all of their boxes Press the ‘start bulk_extractor’ button to being the scan FTK Imager: Upload disk image from the F:\Drive into FTK Imager v3.4.0.5. On the left hand side, click on the location i.e HD1, then select the file path (it will be the only option in the evidence tree). Upon clicking, there will be a file list in the middle column, and a column full of text and UNICODE on the far right. This is where all of the data is. Since there is no file system, the program pulls data haphazardly. In FTK Imager, you can use “Ctrl + F” to search from strings, but be wary of what language you are searching in. Select the “wrap” option as well, to ensure that if a string crosses more than one line, it will be recorded in the results. Analyze Which Data Recovery Tools Reign Supreme?

At the current point in the project, Autopsy is proving to be the most effective tool for data recovery. Autopsy has a very user friendly interface. This provides ease of access and lower frustrations when dealing with drives that have been wiped. Also, Autopsy is very thorough in the way that it searches, parsing through nearly every single file, and every bit of unallocated space. FTK Imager is a very good tool as well, yet does not have a very easy interface to work with. This is not what would be known as a “deal breaker”, but plays into our analysis as we spend a lot of time analyzing these drives, so ease of access is a crucial part. Bulk Extractor is a utility that runs off of command line, but has a GUI—or Graphical User Interface—to facilitate the process for those who are not comfortable with command line utilities. This tool runs the drive analysis as raw data, and finds everything that is on the drive, which is very helpful for data recovery.

The last tool we have used is bstrings by Eric Zimmerman. Bstrings is a command line utility that only runs as such, making it a bit more difficult than the other tools to be comfortable with. It is ridiculously thorough, as it pulls anything and everything off of the drive that’s considered a string. However, due to CPU constraints, this tool does take the longest to fully finish, often over 24 hours.

Image of a trophy with a 1 on it

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The post Data Recovery Blog 2 appeared first on The Leahy Center for Digital Forensics & Cybersecurity.

April 30, 2020 by LCDI

Intrusion into the IoT: The Final Blog

Recap: Intrusion Blogs 1/2

In last month’s blog, the IoT Intrusion team hit a major roadblock with the TP-Link Kasa camera, but were able to overcome it through research into Man in the Middle Attacks. Now, armed with more knowledge than before, our team pressed on to new devices. We moved much faster this month than last. We started investigations into the intrusion of two devices, one of which we completed. These devices proved to be good subjects for investigation, but there are so many at the LCDI that we would have liked to look into. Hopefully, the end of the year does not bring the end of the project.

Picture of the D-Link DCS 5030L

D-Link DCS 5030L

After our struggles with the TP-Link, the team decided to work on a different IoT security camera: the D-Link DCS 5030L. We were originally attracted to this device by a statement that the FTC put out saying that D-Link needs to increase their security in order to market themselves as offering, “advanced network security.” This gave us hope that the device might not be secure. This proved to be true, as we were able to exploit features letting users control their camera from a browser. We were able to gain access to all elements of the camera. We were able to change the password as well as view a live feed.

Malicious Intrusion Opportunity

Through this, we were able to brainstorm all the ways a malicious hacker could use this intrusion to their advantage. They could hold the device for ransom and require the owner to pay in order to regain access. An attacker could physically break into a room that had one of these cameras in it and then upon leaving erase the camera footage from the SD card. The quick success that our team had the D-Link camera allowed us to move on to another device this month.

picture of the WeMo Insight Switch

WeMo Insight Switch

The next device we decided to work on was the WeMo Insight Switch from Belkin. This device showed up on our radar as a potential subject back in our initial research phase of the project. A serious issue with the device was reported by Bitdefender saying that they had discovered a vulnerability that the switch leaks out wifi passwords. This was based on research done by McAfee that found a vulnerability in the UPnP ports listening on the local network in the device. Our team wants to see what we can do with this information on the device. We have it all set up and ready to test.

The Future of IoT Intrusion

Although this may be the team’s final blog post, this is not the end of our project. We still have a few more weeks scheduled at the Leahy Center. After we attempt our intrusion on the WeMo Insight Switch, we will complete our final report. Make sure to look out for that here when it is published. As our project comes to a close, we ponder what the future may hold. We were only able to scratch the surface of this very in depth and involved line of research. That said, we hope this project laid the groundwork for future research.

Stay up to date with Twitter @ChampForensics, Instagram @ChampForensics, and Facebook @ChamplainLCDI so you always know what we’re up to!

The post Intrusion into the IoT: The Final Blog appeared first on The Leahy Center for Digital Forensics & Cybersecurity.

April 30, 2020 by LCDI

Application Analysis Blog 2

Application Analysis Continued

On the Application Analysis team, we have been busy recovering data from deleted programs. Please refer to this link for our previous blog post and more information about what we do!

Google Drive

Since our last update, the team has been busy digging through Google Drive. While we found a lot of information, we also learned about some unknown features of the application. When a user starts the installation for Google Drive, the application creates a new folder. Also added is a syncing program to download and upload the files locally. This is important to be aware of because once one deletes a program, this local folder and all the files within are still available. This is a good feature for user interface, even if it is at the cost of security. If the user has files on their drive and still need them offline, it provides easy access. The problem arises if the user wanted all traces of their google drive gone from their computer in a single deletion.

In our experiment, we created test profiles and tested all of the capabilities of the application. Then, we investigated what information we could access after deleting the application from the computer. The separate folder had all of the information that was linked and downloaded to Google Drive and its local folder. The problem with drive storage versus cloud storage is that anything that you have downloaded lacks the need for a user login and password. In addition, the folder created during installation is shown under “Quick Access” even after deletion, making it easily visible to unwanted users.

Introducing Axiom

When the team started investigating the evidence in Magnet Axiom (a commercial digital forensics investigation tool), the beneficial applications of this method became apparent. The deletion of the application doesn’t retain the Google user’s information (password, email, name, etc), but the URL to the Google document is.

Picture of analysis tool results for Google Drive

The link to the Google Drive is to the right under Evidence Information

All of the files that were stored under the “Google Drive” folder locally were accessible from Axiom. In addition, all files contained a link back to the drive that can be opened in browser. When you go to open the file online links from Axiom to the Google Drive, unless you possess the login information, the rest of the information is safe. In a way this ensures future data security, as any future iterations of files are not accessible after the deletion of the app unless the user is accessing it. It is a bit of both worlds for accessibility and security, as expected from such a large and well-developed company.

Dropbox

The team has also spent time sifting through Dropbox data from a similarly structured experiment. After we loaded the virtual machine file into Axiom, we saw that the system stores all Dropbox-based files, even after deleting the program from the computer.

Screenshot showing the dropbox files visible in Axiom

Axiom processes a variety of information: when the user logged into the program, when they downloaded the default Dropbox files, the files/folders Dropbox stores and creates, when they were created, and the direct file paths of the files.

Screenshot showing specific information about one of the Dropbox files

The system Google implemented is still very much present in Dropbox. The program created a folder in the file system locally that remained after the deletion of the application. However, the information in the image above does not include a link back to Dropbox. If there was not a folder for the information, there would be very little distinguishing information within the files showing that Dropbox downloaded them. Dropbox however unlike Google, does not have its own format(Google Documents, Google Presentation, etc) or online application for documents and files, a factor which likely influenced this approach.

Conclusion

Considering the type of user interaction these services provide, this outcome is surprising, but not entirely difficult to understand. It is important information to anyone who may be trying to compromise your data. In order to rid your system of all the above information, the user will need to do it manually. It is clear to see that one can’t delete all of the information by uninstalling the desktop version of the program.

In the coming weeks we will be investigating Steam. As the largest video game platform worldwide, it would need to keep its users’ data safe.

We will be sure to let everyone know the verdict on our next Application Analysis blog!

Stay up to date with Twitter @ChampForensics, Instagram @ChampForensics, and Facebook @ChamplainLCDI so you always know what we’re up to!

The post Application Analysis Blog 2 appeared first on The Leahy Center for Digital Forensics & Cybersecurity.